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"If the manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm

follows, we say that it is done maliciously or intentionally; if not so
great, but still considerable, we say that the harm is done
negligently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it mischance."'
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

1.
(1894).

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1
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I. INTRODUCTION

Workers' compensation is a form of strict liability. 2 It is a system
where employers are responsible for their employees' injuries despite fault.
In return, the Florida Statutes preclude employees from suing3 their
employers for damages available under the common law tort system. The
exclusive remedy provision of the Florida Workers' Compensation Act
provides this preclusive effect and gives rise to the workers' compensation
immunity defense to tort actions.4 Certain situations exist, however, where
an employer may still be exposed to tort liability.5 The intentional tort
exception is such a situation.6
Recently, in Turner v. PCR, Inc.,7 the Supreme Court of Florida
recognized and reaffirmed the existence of an intentional tort exception!
Additionally, the court held that an objective standard may be used to judge
an employer's conduct. 9 Now, employers may be accountable under this
exception for conduct that a reasonable person, in the employer's position,
would understand as "substantially certain" to result in injury or death to an
employee. 10
This comment discusses the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Turner, as it addresses the intentional tort exception to workers'
compensation as an exclusive remedy. In addition, it considers the impact
the Turner decision may have on future litigation against employers. Part II
gives a brief overview of workers' compensation in Florida as it describes
benefits and disadvantages of the current system, and discusses case law
concerning this exception prior to Turner. Part III outlines the facts of
Turner, and Part IV summarizes the procedural posture of the case.
Next, Parts V and VI analyze the arguments presented by both sides of
this dispute as they pertain to the intentional tort exception and employer
conduct. Part VII describes in detail the Supreme Court of Florida's
decision. Part VIII reflects on the decision and discusses its impact,
particularly questioning what the court considers "substantial certainty," and
providing a possible interpretation. This section additionally discusses the
2.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 80, at 573

(5th ed. 1984).

3.

FLA. STAT.

§ 440.11 (2000).

4.
Id.
5.
Robert L. Dietz & Robert E. Mansbach, Jr., Workers' Compensation Law: Dual
Challengesto Exclusive Employer Liability, 66 FLA. BAR J. 53, 55 (1992).
6.
Id.

7.

754 So. 2d 683 (Fa. 2000).

8.
9.

Id. at 691.
Id.

10.

Id. at 688.
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procedural aspect as it relates to surviving summary judgment in this type of
case. Part IX concludes that holding employers responsible for intentional
acts, as defined by this court's opinion, is appropriate. However, extending
an objective standard to employees' conduct may also help in creating a
system where both employers and employees are encouraged to behave
responsibly and promote workplace safety.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

A.

Benefits and Disadvantages

In Florida, the legislature enacted workers' compensation law to
provide benefits including medical care and lost wages to employees for
accidental injuries arising in the course and scope of employment." The
intent was to assure a "quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical
benefits" and facilitate the employee's return to work at a reasonable cost to
the employer.' 2 The legislature designed the workers' compensation system
to: replace uncertain remedies with certain ones; avoid the expenses of
litigation; and resolve employment injury disputes through a more efficient
and less costly system' 3
Generally, to receive benefits, employees need only to inform their
employer of an injury within thirty days.' Employers must pay benefits
despite who is at fault. 5 Additionally, certain occupational illnesses are
covered.16 Therefore, employees benefit from prompt guaranteed medical
care and disability benefits for lost wages. On the other hand, litigation
within the workers' compensation system is increasingly a disadvantage.
Originally intended to be the exception rather than the rule, litigation is
becoming more frequent as employees try to prove eligibility, injury
causation, and pursue washout settlements.' 7 Additionally, although medical

11. FlA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000).
12. Id.
13. Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: Is
FederalReform the Answer?, 34 WAK FOREST L. REv. 1083, 1089 (1999).
14. § 440.185(t); see also JOHN J. DUBREUiL, FLORIDA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
HANDBOOK, § 2.02 (1999) (explaining employee reporting of injuries and occupational

illnesses in general).
15. DUBREUIL, supra note 14, §§ 1.0114], 1.0211]; KEETON, supra note 2, § 80, at
573.
16.
17.

DUBREUIL, supra note 14, § 8.01[1]-[8]; KEnTON, supra note 2, § 80, at 575.
DUBREUIL, supra note 14, § 1.0115].
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care is paid, if an employee loses time from work, he or she only receives a
percentage of his or her lost wages.'8
The benefits and disadvantages for employers are similar. Generally,
employers benefit because they are immune from tort liability if they
participate in the system. 19 Thus, employers for the most part escape the
expense of litigating employee injury claims. . Unfortunately, the system,
intended as an efficient and less expensive alternative, has still been costly
for employers. Medical care is not cheap and lost-time costs can be
considerable. For instance, nationally in 1984, employers spent an estimated
thirty billion dollars in annual workers' compensation costs. 1 In 1993, that
figure rose to seventy billion dollars. 22 However, due to reform measures
over the last few years, costs have slightly declined.23 Still, many criticize
the effectiveness of the system as a solution for injured employees or a
remedy for businesses faced with costly claims, demands for settlements,
and increasing insurance premiums. 2A
B.

Intentional Tort Exception

Although workers' compensation is generally an exclusive remedy for
employees, in 1986 the Supreme Court of Florida, in Fisherv. Shenandoah
General Construction Co., remarked that employers were not immune from
suit if they have engaged in intentional acts either designed to result in, or
substantially certain to, harm an employee.2 In Fisher,an employer ordered
an employee to clean the inside of an underground pipe with a high pressure
hose, resulting in the employee's death due to methane gas fumes. 27 The
employee's personal representatives sued his employer, alleging
Shenandoah's conduct constituted an intentional tort and therefore did not
fall within the scope of Florida workers' compensation law.2
The original question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida in
Fisher addressed whether Florida workers' compensation law precluded
actions by employees against their employers for intentional torts, if the

18.
19.

FLA. STAT.

§ 440.15 (2000).

20.

See generally KEETON, supra note 2, § 84, at 601.
Id.

21.

See Gabel, supra note 13, at 1089.

22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
See Id.

25.

498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986).

26.
27.
28.

See id. at 883.
Id.
Id.
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injuries occurred within the scope of their employment.29 ' However, the
court refrained from answering the question directly, because it held that the
facts in Fisher did not state an intentional tort cause of action. 3° The
complaint alleged that the employer required the deceased employee to
engage in an activity that would "'in all probability' cause injury or death." 31
Instead, the court restated the certified question and addressed whether an
employer commits an intentional tort when he orders his employee to engage
in an activity that the employer knows to be3 2dangerous, and that will "in all
probability result in injury to the employee.
Expectedly, the court answered no; probable injury was insufficient to
prove an intentional tort.33 In doing so, however, it essentially addressed the
original question stating, "[in order for an employer's actions to amount to
an intentional tort, the employer must either exhibit a deliberate intent to
injure or engage in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury
or death." What was missing in Fisher's complaint was the "substantial
certainty" element.35 Decided the same day, Lawton v. Alpine Engineered
Products,Inc.,3 met the same fate. In Lawton, the court held that a willful
and wanton disregard for the safety of employees is different from
committing an intentional tort.37 Additionally, "[t]his [intentional tort]
standard requires more than a strong probability of injury. It requires virtual
certainty."3
Now, in Turner v. PCR, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida recognizes
and reaffirms that "workers' compensation law does not protect an employer
from liability for an intentional tort against an employee. 3 9 This opinion
specifically addresses and explains the alternative bases for recovery under
this excep0ion and how it takes a step back from the requirement of virtual
certainty.

29.

Id. at 882-83.

30. Fisher,498 So. 2d at 883.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33.

Id. at 883-84.

34. Id.at 883.
35. Fisher,498 So. 2d at 884.
36. 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986).
37. Id. at 880.
38.
39.

Id. (emphasis added).
754 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 2000).

40. Id.
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
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IMI. THE FACTUAL SITUATION OF TURNER V. PCR, INC.
On November 22, 1991, an explosion occurred at a chemical plant in
Alachua County, Florida, killing Paul Turner and seriously injuring James
Creighton. 41 At the time of the explosion, PCR, Inc. ("PCR"), employed
both Turner and Creighton as technicians. 42
E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co. hired PCR to develop a chemical
replacement compound for Freon 113. 43 The creation of the replacement

compound (F-pentene-2) involved complicated chemical processes.
Initially, requiring a difficult and unstable three-ste? procedure, the process
Subsequently, PCR
resulted in several explosions and meltdowns.
modified the process.46 Before the November 22 explosion, PCR made
thirty-six runs of the F-pentene-2 process. 47 Thirty of those runs involved
quantities less than or equal to twenty gallons. 48 Six involved two-hundred
gallon runs. 49 The explosion at issue occurred during the seventh, twohundred gallon run. 50 Appellants produced evidence showing "at least
three" other explosions involving the manufacture of F-pentene-2, although
the processes involved differed. 1 However, the November 22 explosion
resulted from mixing three chemicals required to produce F-pentene-2, in
52 a
one hundred pound liquid fuel cylinder lacking any pressure relief device.
Turner and Creighton retained two chemical experts to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the incident.53 The experts provided affidavits
stating it was substantially certain an explosion would result from mixing
large quantities of the chemicals at issue, tetrafluoroethylene ('TFE"),
hexafluoropropene ("HFP"), and aluminum chloride, in a propane tank,
rather than in a reactor equipped with pressure release valves and other
safety features.M The experts stated that TFE in particular, was 'highly
41.

Id.at 684.

42. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 4, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683
(Fla.2000) (No. 94,468).
43. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 684.
44. Initial Brief of Appellants at 1, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
45.
46.

Id.at2.
Id.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
Id.
Id.
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reactive,' 'prone to spontaneous and violent decomposition when heated or
compressed,"' and required special equipment and precautions when
handled. 55 Evidence was also presented that ICI, the manufacturer of TFE,
had notified PCR
56 that it was discontinuing supplying TFE due to its
hazardous nature.
Both experts concluded that due to intense pressure placed on PCR and
the nearing phase-out date for the legal use and manufacture of Freon, PCR
intentionally changed the protocol for producing F-pentene-2 to
accommodate the existing reaction facility that was unsuited for that
purpose.57 Furthermore, evidence was presented that Turner voiced
concerns regarding the safety of the project and PCR never informed
Creighton regarding the hazards.5 8 Finally, PCR, knowing TFE was
dangerously unstable, allowed the practice of manually inverting the
chemical containers thus, making it substantially certain employees would be
harmed.5 9

IV. PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF TURNER V.PCR, INC.
Turner's estate, along with Creighton and his wife, sued PCR for
wrongful death and personal injuries arising out of alleged intentional torts
to injury, battery, fraudulent
intentional exposure
including:
misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.6 PCR
claimed immunity as Turner and Creighton's employer and alleged they
were only entitled to workers' compensation benefits. 61 The trial court
granted summary judgment for PCR based on workers' compensation
immunity pursuant to section 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes.6 2
Additionally, the trial court held the experts' affidavits amounted to
conclusory statements rather than evidence of facts.63 The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order but certified the following
question of "great public importance" to the Supreme Court of Florida:

55. Id.
56. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(Fla. 2000)

Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
Initial Brief of Appellants at 4, Turner (No. 94,468).
Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 2, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683
(No. 94,468).

61. Id.
62. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 686.
63. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 19-20, Turner (No. 94,468).
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IS AN EXPERT'S AFFIDAVIT, EXPRESSING THE OPINION
THAT AN EMPLOYER EXHIBITED A DELIBERATE INTENT
TO INJURE OR ENGAGED IN CONDUCT SUBSTANTIALLY
CERTAIN TO RESULT IN INJURY OR DEATH TO AN
EMPLOYEE, SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A FACTUAL
DISPUTE, THUS PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE ISSUE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IMMUNITY?64
V. THE APPELLANTS URGE THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA TO ANSWER
THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

Turner and Creighton (Appellants) in their initial brief asked the
Supreme Court of Florida to answer the certified question in the affirmative
for two reasons. 65 First, Appellants argued the experts' affidavits proffered
on their behalf must be considered before rendering summary judgment in
Second, Appellants argued the experts'
favor of PCR (Appellee).6
affidavits "present genuine issues of material fact precluding Appellee's
motion for summary judgment and the order of the district court should be
reversed." 67
Addressing their first argument, Appellants acknowledged that the
lower courts in this case questioned the applicability of experts' affidavits
6
8
and the weight they must be given in summary judgment proceedings.
Defending the applicability, Appellants cited Buchman v. Seaboard Coast
Line Railroad,69 where the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the elements
for admissibility of expert testimony. 70 The two elements required for
admitting expert testimony are: first, "the subject must be beyond the
common understanding of the average layman"; and second, the witness
must 7,ossess knowledge that will aid the trier of fact in determining the
Likewise, Appellants argued the subject matter in this case was
truth.
"highly technical and well outside the common knowledge of the jury," and
additionally, the affidavits supporting a showing of material issues of fact. 72

64. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 684.
65. Initial Brief of Appellants at 11, 16, Turner v.PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
2000) (No. 94,468).
66. Id.at 11.
67. Id.at 16.

68. Id.
at 11.
69. 381 So. 2d 229 (Fla.1980).
70. Id. at 230.
71.

Id.

72. Initial Brief of Appellants at 14, Turner (No.94,468).
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In particular, the experts' findings were. necessary to create, at a
minimum, a question of fact for the jury. Appellants claimed the issue was
whether Appellee knew or should have known its specific actions or
omissions, such as allowing highly volatile gases to be manually mixed in
containers without pressure relief valves, were substantially certain to result
in injury or death to an employee. 73 In further support of their argument,
witness
Appellants cited several other cases where courts relied upon exlpert
74
affidavits in granting or denying motions for summary judgment.
For example, Appellants cited Roster v. Moulton, a Fourth District
Court of Appeal case addressing the significance of experts' affidavits in
summary judgment proceedings. 6 Roster involved a personal injury action
filed against a bar after a customer struck the plaintiff, a bicyclist, with his
vehicle while leaving.77 The trial court considered the affidavits of two
expert witnesses stating that the amount of alcohol the defendant consumed
over a short period, with no outward evidence of physical impairment, would
have put a reasonable server of alcoholic beverages on notice that the
defendant was "habitually addicted."7 8 These affidavits helped in creating
an issue of fact, whether bar employees knew the defendant was addicted to
alcohol.79
Additionally, Appellants cited Lugo v. Florida East Coast Railway
Co. In Lugo, a negligence and strict liability action brought under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, the trial court excluded the plaintiff's
expert witness from testifying because he had not been listed as a witness,
violating the court's pretrial order.8 1 However, the Third District Court of
Appeal refused to affirm for other reasons but stated, "we must assume that
the trial court found the expert qualified to render an opinion, and his
affidavit testimony reasonably credible, as it was the only evidence it could
82
have relied upon in denying defendants' motions for summary judgment."
As these examples suggest, judges consider expert testimony in summary
judgment proceedings and use the affidavits as evidence to deny motions for
summary judgment.
Appellants not only claimed the court must consider their experts'
affidavits, but that the affidavits set forth evidence creating disputable issues
73.
74.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 12-14.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

602 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Initial Brief of Appellants at 13-14, Turner (No. 94,468).
Roster, 602 So. 2d at 975.
Id. at 976 n.2.
See id. at 976.

80.
81.
82.

487 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 324.

Published by NSUWorks, 2000

9

Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 11

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 25:365

83

for trial. Infavor of their second argument, Appellants cited the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure for granting summary judgment stating, summary
judgment will be rendered if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."" Therefore, the
moving party5 has the burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material
fact for trial.1
Appellants used Holl v. Talcott 6 to illustrate this point. 7 Holl was a
medical malpractice action where the petitioner claimed she suffered
complications due to the negligence of her surgeons and others. 88 Here, the
Supreme Court of Florida discussed experts' affidavits and the alleged
deficiencies of such when offered by respondents in support of summary
judgment. 89 In fact, the court found the respondents' affidavits did not
demonstrate conclusively that the respondents were not npgligent and
therefore, they were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore,
the respondents, as movants, did not meet their burden and this being so, the
sufficiency of the petitioner's affidavit should never have been reached. 91
Using these arguments, Appellants clarified that they were not alleging
that Appellee's conduct was designed or actually intended to result in
serious bodily injury or death. 92 Instead, they claimed that intentional acts
by Appellee, perhaps motivated by business concerns, were substantially
certain to cause harm, and the experts' testimony explains the conditions
that support this position. 93 Additionally, all inferences must be resolved in
favor of the non-moving party. 94 Thus, the affidavits illuminated material
issues of objective intent and substantialcertainty that can only be resolved
at trial.95

83. Initial Brief of Appellants at 16, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
84. Id. (citing FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.5 10).
85. Id. at 16-17.
86. 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
87. Initial Brief of Appellants at 16, Turner (No. 94,468).
88. Holl, 191 So. 2d at 42.
89. Id. at 44-45.
90. Id. at 45.
91. Id.
92. Initial Brief of Appellants at 19, Turner (No. 94,468).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 20.
95. See id. at 27.
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VI. THE APPELLEE URGES THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA TO ANSWER
THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE

In response to the Appellants' arguments, PCR acknowledged
disagreement with much of the Appellants' statement of the facts and
claimed Appellants' version was not supported by the record.9 Appellee's
main arguments consisted of: first, an affidavit from a scientific expert does
not preclude summary judgment if the affidavit does not create a dispute as
affidavit is insufficient
to a material issue of fact; and second, a conclusory
97
to create a factual issue as to an intentional tort.
Supporting the first argument, Appellee stated the affidavits opposing
summary judgment must demonstrate the existence of a material issue of
fact. 9s To determine this, it is necessa97 to judge the affidavits against the
standard forroving an intentional tort. This is not contrary to Appellants'
arguments.luo However, Appellee stated the issue was whether the employer
committed an intentional tort against its employees. 10' Proving this required
evidence suggesting that the employer had actualsubjective knowledge that
its conduct was substantially certain to cause injury or death. 1°2 Therefore,
to create a material issue of fact, the experts' affidavits must provide
evidence that the employer subjectively knew this result
0 3 was substantially
certain to occur and set forth facts supporting this claim.
Appellee admitted that the affidavits in question could be used to
establish that the employer knowingly created an unsafe workplace. 1' 4
However, Appellee claimed that, in order to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, the affidavit must show that the employer knew that his or her
conduct was substantially certain to result in injury or death. 0 5 Therefore,
because Appellants failed to show actual knowledge on the part of the
of its acts, the affidavits were insufficient
employer as to the consequences
16
to defeat summary judgment. 0

96. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 3, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683
(Fla. 2000) (No. 94,468).
97. Id. at 9,15.
98. Id. at9.

99. Id.at 10.
100. See Initial Brief of Appellants at 18-21, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
2000) (No. 94,468).
101. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 7, Turner (No. 94,468).

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 15.

106. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 8, Turner (No. 94,468).
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
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Supporting its second argument, Appellee stated Florida courts have
held that conclusory affidavits are insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. 10 7 For example, Appellee cited Clark v. Gumby's Pizza
Systems, Inc.,10 8 where the plaintiff-employee alleged that the employer
knew with substantial certainty one of its employees would be assaulted
while delivering pizza to a particular college campus at night. 1' The First
District Court of Appeal in Clark stated, "conclusory allegations of
'substantial certainty' do not raise otherwise insufficient allegations of fact
to the level of [an] intentional tort."" Important in Clark is the court's
definition of substantial certainty. There, the court cited Fisher, equating
substantial certainty with virtual certainty."' Therefore, the affidavit in
Clark was ineffective because it did not provide facts supporting a level of
virtual certainty on the part of the employer. 1 2 Likewise, considering the
court's prior holding regarding substantial certainty as virtually sure,
Appellee argued the affidavits
of Appellants' experts did not provide facts
113
supporting this claim.
Appellants replied, stating that Appellee misinterpreted the alternative
bases for showing an employer had the requisite intent to prove the
commission of an intentional tort and actual subjective knowledge was not
required under the substantial certainty test."14 As a result, the Supreme
Court of Florida decided a clarification of this issue was necessary; whether
actual subjective knowledge of the employer was15required to find intent, and
refrained from addressing the certified question."
VII. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA DECLINES TO ADDRESS THE
CERTIFIED QUESTION & ALTERNATIVELY DECIDES PROOF NEEDED FOR
INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION

The Supreme Court of Florida declined to address the certified
6
question.1
Instead,
court
what aofclaimant-employee
must
show
when attempting
to the
prove
theclarified
commission
an intentional tort,
thereby

107. Id. at 15.
108. 674 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
109. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 16, Turner (No. 94,468).
110. Clark,674 So. 2d at 904.
Ili. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 23, Turner (No. 94,468).
114. Reply Brief of Appellants at 1, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
115. Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 2000).
116. Id. at 684.
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disallowing an employer from invoking an otherwise valid workers'
compensation immunity defense. 1 7 Neither argument made by Appellants
nor Appellee claimed expert testimony should be completely disregarded in
summary judgment proceedings. 18 As previously noted, the Appellee
essentially addressed the underlying issue implying that if actual knowledge
requiring an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the employer is
necessary to prove an intentional tort, an expert's opinion that does not
address the actual knowledge issue is of little use in creating a genuine issue
of material fact. 9 Noting this line of thought, the court cited previous
decisions setting forth two alternative bases for proving an intentional tort,
including one allowing an objective finding of intent based on a reasonable
person standard. 120
A.

The Objective vs. Subjective Standard

The Supreme Court of Florida in Fisher set forth the disjunctive two
part test for proving an intentional tort.121 The court takes note that
Appellants do not claim that Appellee acted with deliberate malice toward
them.
Therefore, the first part of the Fishertest is not at issue.'2 Instead,
Appellants claimed the conduct of Appellee fell under the second part of the
Fisher test- Appellee engaged in acts substantially certain to result in injury
or death.12 Thus, the court decided the issue was whether a subjective or
objective standard is appropriate for judging the conduct of an employer
under the second part of the Fishertest.'2
An objective standard requires an analysis of the facts of a case to
determine if the employer's conduct was substantially certain to result in
injury or death.' 26 The employer's actual intention to harm is not
determinative.127 The court pointed out that if subjective intent were
required under the second part of the Fisher test, there would be no
alternative basis for recovery against an employer.12 A consequence of this
117. Id.
118. See Initial Brief of Appellants at 11, Turner v. PCR, Inc. 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
2000) (No. 94,468); Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 7, Turner (No. 94,468).
119.
120.
121.
122.

Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 7-8, Turner(No. 94,468).
Turner,754 So. 2d at 688.
Id. at 687; see supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
Turner,754 So. 2d at 688.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 688-89.
Id. at 688.

127. Turner,754 So. 2d at 688.

128. Id.
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holding would be that an employee could only recover in those situations
where the employer actually intended to harm the employee.'2 9 In fact, in
many previous cases, Florida courts held the employer must subjectively
know that injury
or death was virtually certain to rise to the level of an
13
intentional tort. 0
However, the Supreme Court of Florida in Turner attributed the second
part of the Fisher test to Spivey v. Battaglia,131 where it held if a reasonable
person would believe a particular result was substantially certain to follow,
the law finds he intended it.' 32 Therefore, intention may be imputed where
the facts indicate a reasonable person in the employer's position would
realize or should have realized certain acts were substantially certain to
cause injury. 33 In other words, proving intent under the second part of
Fisherrequires evidence showing conduct which a reasonable person in the
employer's position should know is substantially certain to result in injury or
death. '
B.

Virtual vs. SubstantialCertainty

The court recognized that in previous cases, particularly Fisher and
Lawton, it declined to answer explicitly whether an intentional tort was a
valid exception to workers' compensation immunity.1'3 As stated earlier,
this was due to the complainant's failure to allege a prima facie case of an
intentional tort. 136 Specifically, both cases spoke of "probable injury" when
in fact, substantial certainty is required. 137 Presenting evidence in support of
an objective finding of intent requires an understanding of what "substantial
certainty" means. The court recedes from equating substantial certainty with

129. Id.
130. See Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986); Lawton
v. Alpine Eng'rd Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986); Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc. v.
Dipaolo, 653 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); UPS v. Welsh, 659 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
131. 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972).
132. Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 688 (Fla. 2000) (citing Spivey, 258 So. 2d at
817). The court cited and relied upon the Second Restatement of Torts when forming the basis
for its holding. Id.
133. Spivey, 258 So. 2d at 816-17.
134. See id.; Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 1986).
135. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687; Fisher,498 So. 2d at 883; Lawton v. Alpine Eng'rd
Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986).
136. Turner,754 So. 2d at 687.
137. Id.
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virtual certainty, and explains the concept as38 something greater than gross
negligence but less than being virtually sure.
In Turner, the court hinted that substantial certainty may be something
closer to "culpable negligence." 139 Citing Eller v. Shova,' 40 the Supreme
Court of Florida defined culpable negligence as "reckless indifference" or
"grossly careless disregard" of human life. 141 The court considers culpable
negligence greater than gross negligencd, but it is clear the distinction
involves a matter of degree. 142 Some clues to the type of conduct or
circumstances supporting a finding of substantial certainty are provided by
two cases cited in this opinion.
In Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc.,143 the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed summary judgment based on the workers' compensation immunity
defense for an employer airline.'" The court stated:
It is quite reasonable to conclude, as a matter of law, that a
passenger aircraft which is routinely overloaded and poorly
maintained, with known mechanical deficiencies including a
leaking hydraulic system, regular engine stalls, overheating, and
faulty thrust reversers, will--to a substantial certainty-eventually
succumb to the incessant forces
of gravity causing serious injury to,
45
or the death of, those aboard.1
Furthermore, the facts of Connelly suggested that the airline withheld
knowledge of the defects and hazards from its employees so they were not
permitted to exercise an informed judgment of whether to perform their
assigned duties.14
Likewise, in Cunninghamv. Anchor Hocking Corp.,' 47 the First District
Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the employer. 14 The
allegations and supporting evidence in this case described a situation where
a glass manufacturer, the employer, diverted the smokestack of the plant's
exhaust system allowing toxic fumes to flow into, rather than out of the
working environment, and periodically turned off the ventilation system,
138. Id. at 687 n.4.
139. Id. at 687 n.3.
140. 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1993).
141. Turner,754 So. 2d at 687 n.3.
142. See Eller, 630 So. 2d at 541 n.3.
143. 568 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).

144. Id. at451.
145. Id.; see Turner,754 So. 2d at 690-91.
146. Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451; Turner,754 So. 2d at 691.
147. 558 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1990).

148. Id. at 100.
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intensifying the employees' level of exposure. 149 Additionally, they removed
warning labels from chemical containers, misrepresented the nature of toxic
substances, and ignored the need for safety equipment. 50 Therefore, the
repeated and continuous exposure, intentionally increased and worsened by
the employer, supported the employees' contention that injury was
substantially certain to occur.' 51 Thus, these actions supported an intentional
tort cause of action. 15z Of note, in both cases there was evidence that the
deliberate actions or omissions of the
employer were done to increase profits
153
at the expense of employee safety.
The facts of Turner are similar to Connelly and Cunningham. In
Turner, the court specifically stated the alleged conduct of PCR, if proven,
was at least as disturbing. 54 Appellants' experts claimed that serious danger
existed due to the known hazardous activity involved, based on personal
knowledge obtained through their investigation. 155 Additionally, the experts
offered evidence of at least three other explosions that occurred at the plant
in less than two years involving a chemical used in the fatal November 22
explosion. 56 Furthermore, the evidence suggested that PCR intentionally
stepped up production, intentionally disregarded the safety of its employees,
and failed to warn them of the highly explosive nature of TFE, in order to
meet an approaching deadline and increase profits. 57 Significantly, like
Connelly and Cunningham, this case "share[s] a common thread of evidence
that the employer tried to cover up the danger, affording the employees no
means to make a reasonable decision as to their actions." r
Once an act by an employer is considered actually or constructively
intentional and results in harm to an employee, the court stated such an event
should not be covered under workers' compensation immunity for the
following reasons. 59 First, under the statute, compensation is payable for
accidental disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment. 6° Furthermore, an accident is defined as an unexpected or

149. Id. at 95-97; Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690.
150. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Turner,754 So. 2d at 690.

151. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 97.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 96; Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.App.
1990).
154. Turner,754 So. 2d at 690.
155. See id.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 691.
See id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
Turner,754 So. 2d at 689.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1) (2000).
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unusual happening or event, occurring suddenly. 61 Therefore, the court
pointed out that if an event is substantially certain to occur as the result of an
employer's act, then it is neither unexpected nor.unusual and thus, does not
62
meet the definition of an accident under the Workers' Compensation Act.1
Finally, the court stressed that workers' compensation is not intended to
shield employers from liability for intentional torts and is not to be construed
in favor of the employer or the employee.163 The existence of "workers'
compensation should not affect the pleading or proof of an intentional
tort." 16 In sum, the workers' compensation immunity defense is not
intended to block intentional tort suits at the summary judgment phase.' 65
VIII. OPINION
A.

Surviving Summary Judgment

This decision by the Supreme Court of Florida is a logical and wellreasoned summary of the alternative bases available to prove the commission
of an intentional tort resulting in injury to an employee. The court points out
that it makes good public policy to hold employers responsible for
intentional conduct resulting in injury. 166 The decision provides a road map
for plaintiffs' attorneys filing claims under this exception.
To get a claim to trial successfully, it is necessary to allege either the
employer committed intentional acts designed to harm the employee and/or
alternatively, committed intentional acts the employer should have known
were substantially certain to cause harm' 7 This case, unlike previous
cases, survived summary judgment because substantial certainty of harm was
alleged and sul
ported with credible evidence thereby creating an issue of
1
material fact.
B.

Defining Substantial Certainty

An understanding of what is meant by "intent" and "substantial
certainty" is important when pleading an intentional tort exception. An actor
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

§ 440.02(1).
Turner,754 So. 2d at 689.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Turner,754 So. 2d at 688-89.
168. Compare Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986),
with Lawton v. Alpine Eng'rd Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986).
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manifests intent when he or she desires to cause the consequences of the
act. 169 However, if the actor knows, or should know, the consequences of his
or her actions are substantially certain to occur and still
170 proceeds, the law
treats the actor as having intended to produce the result.
Proving substantial certainty may be difficult.
Acquiring an
understanding of what substantial certainty means is important when setting
forth the facts of the case. No bright line rule currently exists defining
substantial certainty. However, the court provided a few excellent clues
regarding what sort of evidence may support a finding of substantial
certainty on the part of the employer. First, the court states it has retreated
from a requirement of virtual certainty."
What is virtual certainty?
Perhaps the simplest interpretation is also the most common. In everyday
terms, the meaning of virtual is "almost entirely," "nearly," or "for all
practical purposes.' '173 Applying this plain or common meaning, one could
say he or she is virtually sure of something if for all practical purposes it is
inevitable. In essence, this probably means as close as one can come to
being completely certain about something in an uncertain world. Now, it
appears something less than this may do.177
In contrast, the court now states substantial certainty will suffice.
Again, looking to the common meaning of the word "substantial,"
interpretations include: "considerable in quantity," "significantly great," or
"largely but not wholly that which is specified." 76 Yet, what is large or
significant in terms of certainty? Most reasonably, this can only be
determined on a case by case basis, allowing flexibility in weighing the
various social policies involved.177 It is the quantum of evidence, provided
by the particular circumstances surrounding the event, that allows a finding
of substantial certainty. For instance, looking to cases surviving this issue, it
appears that78 evidence eliciting particular behavior is especially
condemning.1

169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965).

170. Id.
171. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 689-91.
172. Id. at 687-88 n.4.
173. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1320 (10th ed. 1993).
174. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687-88 n.4.
175. Id.
176. MERRIAM-WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 173, at 1174.
177. Shannan Clare Sweeney, The Intentional Act Exception to the Exclusivity of
Workers' Compensation,44 LA. L. REv. 1507, 1516 (1984).
178. See Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 96-97 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); see also Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
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The following circumstances may support a finding of an employer's
substantial certainty of inevitable harm.
First, a hazardous work
environment existed at the time the harm occurred.' 79 Second, prior to the
harmful incident, the employer engaged in intentional or deliberate acts or
omissions which created or increased the danger of harm to employees.180
Third, the employer willfully withheld facts from employees concerning the
hazards.' 8 ' Fourth, the employer provided no reasonable defense for its
conduct. 182 Finallyr, the employer exhibited behavior placing profits before
employee safety.1 3 Therefore, the quantity and quality of the evidence
eliciting the employer's acts and motivations must present a set of
circumstances supporting a finding that a reasonable employer would know
its acts were substantially certain to cause harm.
C. ProceduralConsiderations
When an employee brings a tort action against his or her employer, the
employer must plead the workers' compensation statute as a defense.'8 In
other words, the employer must claim workers' compensation immunity. The
employer has the burden to prove: first, the employee was subject to the
workers' compensation act; and second, the act is the employee's exclusive
remedy. 1 5 However, an employer is relieved of this burden in three
situations. The employer does not need affirmative proof when: 1) the
employment relationship is apparent; 2) a worker admits the injury occurred
during employment; and 3) when the employee prosecutes a claim and
accepts compensation. 86
On the other hand, when the employee's complaint alleges facts
admitting coverage under workers' compensation, the complaint must also
allege facts showing an exception to the statute applies.187 For instance, if
the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to apply the intentional tort
exception, no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a general
demurrer. 88 This pleading requirement is jurisdictionally based."' The trial
court lacks jurisdiction if the complaint does not allege facts supporting a
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

187.
188.
189.

Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 95; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.
Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449-51.
Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.
See Cunningham,558 So. 2d at 95-97; see also Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449-51.
Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449.
82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 90 (1992).
Id.
Id.; DUBREUIL, supranote 14, § 3.01[b][iii].
82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation§ 90 (1992).
Id.
Id.
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civil action. '9 Therefore, the action must be dismissed and workers'
compensation law will apply. 91
Notice, Appellants argued that Appellee did not meet its burden of
proof.' 92 Applying the above rule to sustain a motion to dismiss, Appellee
had the burden to prove the employee was subject to workers' compensation
law, and the intentional tort exception did not apply. Additionally,
Appellants had to state sufficient facts in their complaint to assert an
intentional tort exception. Appellants met their burden with the assistance of
expert opinions.193 On the other hand, Appellee failed to show conclusively
that the intentional tort exception did not apply. 194 Appellee's only hope was
that the Fisher test would be read narrowly, and the court would support an
"actual knowledge" theory or hold with the "virtual certainty" standard.
Unfortunately, for Appellee, the court did neither.1 95
Allowing an objective finding of intent based upon substantial certainty
of harm, if pled correctly and supported by evidence, may allow more claims
to get past the summary judgment phase. This may encourage more claims
as employees attempt to evade the exclusivity provision of workers'
compensation. Considering the costs of litigation, this is a significant
concern to employers. The hope is that employers will consider the potential
liability and reexamine their workplace practices. Ideally, the decision will
prevent196or discourage employers from turning a blind eye toward workplace
safety.
IX. CONCLUSION

Common sense tells us successfully creating and maintaining a safe
work environment requires both employers' and employees' participation. It
is clear employers have a recognized moral duty to refrain from conduct
placing employees in danger. Now employers are also legally accountable
for objectively intentional conduct resulting in harm. 197 However, in many
cases employees are sometimes in the best position to recognize potential
hazards and determine what needs to be done to improve or prevent a
dangerous situation. Therefore, to remain true to the original intent of the
190. Id.
191. See id.

192. Initial Brief of Appellants at 22, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
193. Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 691 (Fla. 2000).
194. See id. at 691.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Florida legislature, so as not to construe the law in favor of the employer or
employee, perhaps we should apply a similar standard to employees' conduct
that is substantially certain to cause harm to themselves and others. 19s If
employees may sue their employer for imputed objective intentional harm,
then allowing an employer to withhold benefits or defend on the basis of an
employee's similar conduct may only be fair. Imposing responsibility into a
system immune from blame may be beneficial.
Theresa J. Fontana

198. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000) (discussing the legislature's intent that the Workers'
Compensation Act is not to be construed in favor of the employer or employee).
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